Omnibus tests of differential item functioning

Differential item functioning (DIF) with intersectional groups or interaction effects requires lots more statistical comparisons than traditional groupings do. In large-scale, high-stakes testing programs, we usually look at

  1. race/ethnicity (with around five levels),
  2. sex/gender (two levels),
  3. special education status (two levels),
  4. advantage status (two or three), and
  5. language status (two levels).

A grouping variable with $k = 5$ levels produces $k – 1$ DIF comparisons per item (each group level compared with the reference level), so the traditional approach might involve $4 + 1 + 1 + 1 + 1 = 9$ total comparisons per item. An intersectional approach, in contrast, would involve as many as $5 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 \times 2 – 1 = 79$ (all intersectional levels compared with a single reference intersectional level).

The increase in comparisons leads to an increase in Type I error (DIF by chance). We can adjust for false positives but a simple workaround is to use generalized and omnibus tests in place of repeated pairwise comparisons. Penfield (2001) demonstrated the generalized Mantel-Haenszel and Magis et al. (2011) demonstrated a generalized logistic regression method. Neither used interactions between groups, but the methods still apply. In both studies, the generalized methods tended to be better (more powerful), and a practical benefit is that they’re simpler to implement, with only one test run per item. Finch (2016) compared a few generalized methods.

See this post from 2022 for some background on DIF with intersectional or interaction effects.

Generalized methods also make it easier to reconsider our reference level. The standard approach in DIF is to refer all comparisons to the historically advantaged test takers, so, White, English-speaking, male, etc. My coauthors and I (Albano et al., 2024) gave some recommendations on this point.

The convention of using the historically advantaged test takers as the reference group should also be reconsidered. Because DIF is usually structured as a relative comparison, results will not change except in their signs if reference and focal groups are switched. However, moving away from the conventional reference groups will help to decenter Male and White in discussions of test performance. Alternatives include centering more diverse groups, using models that evaluate DIF effects within groups relative to their own means (we have not seen this method used before) or using models that compare effects against an aggregate of all groups (e.g., Austin & French, 2020).

Omnibus testing comes from ANOVA, where we analyze a set of effects together as a whole before investigating specific comparisons. In the context of DIF, we might not even bother with the post hoc comparisons – an omnibus DIF flag would disqualify an item regardless of the source(s) of variation.

Here’s a simple demonstration with 9 groups, 400 people per group, 20 items, one item having DIF of 0.6 logits for three of the groups, and group abilities normally distributed with means ranging from -1 to 1 logits.

# Load tidyverse
library("tidyverse")

# We also need the epmr package from github
# devtools::install_github("talbano/epmr")

# Generating parameters
set.seed(260120)
ni <- 20
ng <- 9
np <- 400

# 2PL item parameters
ip <- data.frame(a = exp(rnorm(ni, 0, 0.1225)), b = rnorm(ni), c = .2) |> 
  list() |> rep(ng)

# Induce DIF of 0.6 logits on item 1 for groups 2, 6, and 9
ip[[2]]$b[1] <- ip[[6]]$b[1] <- ip[[9]]$b[1] <- ip[[2]]$b[1] + .6

# Theta with range of means by group
theta <- lapply(seq(-1, 1, length = ng), function(m) rnorm(np, m, 1))

# Generate scores by group
scores <- lapply(1:ng, function(g) epmr::irtsim(ip[[g]], theta[[g]]))
scores <- data.frame(rep(paste0("g", 1:ng), each = np),
  do.call("rbind", scores)) |> setNames(c("group", paste0("i", 1:ni)))

DIF is estimated for the first two items with dichotomous Mantel-Haenszel (MH) and logistic regression (LR), and then with generalized methods, using functions from the epmr package.

# Dichotomous DIF, MH and LR
# Eight comparisons per item with g5 as reference group
focal <- paste0("g", 1:ng)[-5]
out_mh <- out_lr <- vector("list", length = ng - 1) |> setNames(focal)
for (g in focal) {
  index <- scores$group %in% c("g5", g)
  temp_scores <- scores[index, -1]
  temp_group <- scores$group[index]
  out_mh[[g]] <- epmr::difstudy(temp_scores, temp_group, ref = "g5",
    method = "mh", dif_items = 1:2, anchor_items = 3:ni)$uniform
  out_lr[[g]] <- epmr::difstudy(temp_scores, temp_group, ref = "g5",
    method = "lr", dif_items = 1:2, anchor_items = 3:ni)$uniform
}

# GMH and GLR DIF
out_gmh <- epmr::difstudy(scores[, -1], scores$group, ref = "g5",
  method = "mh", dif_items = 1:2, anchor_items = 3:ni)$uniform
out_glr <- epmr::difstudy(scores[, -1], scores$group, ref = "g5",
  method = "lr", dif_items = 1:2, anchor_items = 3:ni)$uniform

The generalized methods flagged item 1 (GMH p < .001, GLR p < .001) and item 2 (GMH p = .004, GLR p = .004) for DIF. The next table shows the results for all of the dichotomous comparisons. Even with an unadjusted p-value of .05, MH and LR don’t flag any significant DIF on items 1 or 2 because the thresholds for practical significance (delta for MH and r2d change in R-squared) aren’t met.

itemgroupdeltamh_pets_levlr_pr2dzum_lev
i1g1-0.8640.034a0.0230.008a
i1g2-1.2760.001b0.0010.019a
i1g3-0.3210.445a0.5080.001a
i1g4-0.1670.714a0.6650.000a
i1g6-1.1100.004b0.0010.016a
i1g70.5350.216a0.1380.004a
i1g80.5820.203a0.1560.003a
i1g9-0.0680.946a0.9750.000a
i2g1-0.2450.594a0.5980.000a
i2g2-0.2680.523a0.5250.001a
i2g30.2900.492a0.5670.001a
i2g40.2460.553a0.3800.001a
i2g61.0070.010b0.0060.013a
i2g70.8100.044a0.0660.006a
i2g80.8830.038a0.0410.007a
i2g90.9350.036a0.0360.007a

We can also conduct omnibus DIF tests under an item response theory framework. I mentioned this in my earlier post on DIF with interaction effects. Using the lme4 package, a simple and direct approach is to estimate random effects for item, person, and group, and then an interaction between each DIF item to be tested and group. Here’s some code.

# Stack the data for lme4
scores_long <- scores |> tibble() |> mutate(person = row_number(), .before = 1) |> 
  pivot_longer(cols = i1:i20, names_to = "item", values_to = "score") |> 
  mutate(i1 = ifelse(item == "i1", 1, 0), i2 = ifelse(item == "i2", 1, 0))

# Fit the models
# r2, with DIF estimated for items 1 and 2, is singular
r0 <- lme4::glmer(score ~ 0 + (1 | item) + (1 | person) + (1 | group),
  family = binomial, data = scores_long,
  control = lme4::glmerControl(optimizer = "bobyqa"))
r1 <- lme4::glmer(score ~ 0 + (1 | item) + (1 | person) + (1 + i1 | group),
  family = binomial, data = scores_long,
  control = lme4::glmerControl(optimizer = "bobyqa"))
r2 <- lme4::glmer(score ~ 0 + (1 | item) + (1 | person) + (1 + i1 + i2 | group),
  family = binomial, data = scores_long,
  control = lme4::glmerControl(optimizer = "bobyqa"))

# Compare r0 and r1 to test for DIF
anova(r0, r1)

Here’s a subset of the ANOVA table output comparing fit for models with and without the DIF interaction term for item 1. After the table is the lme4 output for model r1. Person, item, and group have logit standard deviations of 0.71, 0.57, and 0.64 respectively, and performance on item 1 varies over groups with standard deviation 0.22.

nparAIClogLik-2log(L)ChisqPr>Chisq
r0386588-4329186582NANA
r1586577-4328486567140.0007
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace
Approximation) [glmerMod]
Family: binomial ( logit )
Formula: score ~ 0 + (1 | item) + (1 | person) + (1 + i1 | group)
Data: scores_long
AIC BIC logLik -2*log(L) df.resid
86577.40 86623.32 -43283.70 86567.40 71995
Random effects:
Groups Name Std.Dev. Corr
person (Intercept) 0.7070
item (Intercept) 0.5737
group (Intercept) 0.6444
i1 0.2165 0.33
Number of obs: 72000, groups: person, 3600; item, 20; group, 9
No fixed effect coefficients

Finally, we can conduct omnibus DIF analysis using the mirt R package. The first step is to estimate a multi-group Rasch model, then a separate mirt function takes the multi-group output and runs models with and without the grouping variable interacting with each DIF item. The table below shows the output, where AIC and chi-square (X2) indicate DIF for item 1, and no fit indices indicate DIF for item 2.

mirt_mg <- mirt::multipleGroup(scores[, -1], model = 1,
  itemtype = "Rasch", group = scores[, 1],
  invariance = c(paste0("i", 3:20), "free_means", "free_variances"))
mirt_dif <- mirt::DIF(mirt_mg, "d", items2test = c("i1", "i2"))
AICSABICHQBICX2dfp
i1-17.526.570.1331.9933.5280.00
i27.7931.8825.4357.308.2180.41

References

Albano, T., French, B. F., & Vo, T. T. (2024). Traditional vs intersectional DIF analysis: Considerations and a comparison using state testing data. Applied Measurement in Education, 37(1), 57-70.

Austin, B. W., & French, B. F. (2020). Adjusting group intercept and slope bias in predictive equations. Methodology, 16(3), 241–257.

Finch, W. H. (2016). Detection of differential item functioning for more than two groups: A Monte Carlo comparison of methods. Applied measurement in Education29(1), 30-45.

Magis, D., Raîche, G., Béland, S., & Gérard, P. (2011). A generalized logistic regression procedure to detect differential item functioning among multiple groups. International Journal of Testing11(4), 365-386.

Penfield, R. D. (2001). Assessing differential item functioning among multiple groups: A comparison of three Mantel-Haenszel procedures. Applied Measurement in Education, 14(3), 235-259.

Did More Students Pass NY Tests Because the State Lowered Cut Scores?

A friend shared an article from Times Union (paywalled) claiming that more students pass after NY adjusts test scoring.

More students passed this year’s math and English tests, but many of them didn’t have to do as well as last year to be named proficient. After the passing score was adjusted, more than half of the students in grades 3 through 8 reached proficiency in English and math. In English, 53% of the students met the proficiency standard, up from 46% last year. In math, 55% of the students were considered proficient, up from 52% last year.

Two things did happen in New York with the 2025 end-of-year state tests: 1) passing scores, in terms of raw score points, did move and 2) more students did meet standards for some tests and grades.

However, technically, we can’t say the changes in passing scores caused the changes in proficiency rates, because the changes in passing scores came from equating adjustments that account for (small and unintentional) changes in test difficulty compared with prior years, and we can’t possibly know why proficiency rates changed because our cohorts of test takers vary so much over time.

I’ve talked about equating before. From a previous post:

Equating is a statistical procedure used to create a common measurement scale across two or more forms of a test. The main objective in this procedure is to control statistically for difficulty differences so that scores can be used interchangeably across forms.

In essence, with equating, if some test takers have a more difficult version of a test, they’ll get bonus points. Conversely, if we develop a new test form and discover it to be easier than previous ones, we can also take points away from new test takers. In each case, we’re aiming to establish more fair comparisons. In commercial testing operations, test takers aren’t aware of the score adjustments because they don’t see the raw score scale.

The Times Union article includes an explanation of equating from the state, so they seem to know what’s going on, but the rest of the article suggests that the state is fiddling with its numbers to get better results. This does happen occasionally in state testing – we know standards change and are sometimes lowered – but it isn’t happening here.

Notes from NCME 2025

The National Council on Measurement in Education (NCME) held its annual conference in April, so I’ve had a couple months to ruminate on what I learned there. Here are some notes from my notes.

  • I talked to someone about how we really don’t need the term validity. It almost always comes with a type or source of evidence attached, in which case validity could be substituted for another more descriptive term – cultural validity is replaced by culturally responsive, content validity evidence is content alignment. Validity mostly just captures the general idea of effectiveness. Newton and Shaw (2013) suggested “testing quality” as a replacement.
  • A session on The Usefulness of Kane’s “Validity Argument” in Modern Validity Theory got me thinking about how we should acknowledge our philosophical positions when debating validity, because our validity position depends entirely on our philosophical position, and the main philosophical positions (positivism, postmodernism, critical theories) have already been thoroughly hashed out. How should consequences and uses inform validity? That depends on how distinct we consider truth and facts to be from ethics and values.
  • Lots of sessions referenced Randall (2021), who is critical of how validation traditionally aims to minimize construct-irrelevant variance. We should frame things positively instead, so as to maximize construct-relevant variance.
  • People say educational assessment when they’re really talking about educational testing. I’ve also made this mistake. Assessment does sound better, but we need precision here, especially when dealing with culturally responsive/sustaining assessment, which is much more feasible than culturally responsive/sustaining testing. Beware of misleading claims and false advertising.
  • Extending the previous point – I caught the tail end of the session Implications of Culturally Responsive Assessment for Large-Scale Assessment Practices. Someone asked how we reconcile culturally responsive assessment with large-scale testing. One audience member suggested we keep them separate, so as preserve the value of each. Someone replied that separation will result in the two being pitted against each other, in which case large-scale will win. Both are correct, but I’d go with separation if forced to choose.
  • There was a cool session on Evaluating the Psychometric Impacts of Cultural Representation in Item Contexts. Surprisingly, or maybe not, the reported impacts were consistently minimal, but that could be because the cultural adaptations tended to be pretty superficial (e.g., geometry with an Aztec temple instead of a tree).
  • I also attended a few sessions and presented on (Albano, French, & Vo, 2024) differential item functioning, one of my favorite psychometric topics. As is often the case in psychometric modeling as a form of applied stats, we have some fancy and comprehensive models to choose from (e.g., moderated nonlinear factor analysis) but the data and conditions often require that we simplify (Mantel-Haenszel).

References

Albano, T., French, B. F., & Vo, T. T. (2024). Traditional vs intersectional DIF analysis: Considerations and a comparison using state testing data. Applied Measurement in Education, 37(1), 57-70.

Newton, P. E., & Shaw, S. D. (2013). Standards for talking and thinking about validity. Psychological Methods18(3), 301-319.

Randall, J. (2021). “Color‐neutral” is not a thing: Redefining construct definition and representation through a justice‐oriented critical antiracist lens. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 40(4), 82-90.

Do Standardized Tests Benefit from Inequality?

I’m reading Wayne Au’s (2023) Unequal by Design: High Stakes Testing and the Standardization of Inequality, a short (140 pages) overview of how our capitalist education system in the US perpetuates inequities, using testing to turn students into commodities. It’s dramatic at times – Au sets the stage with testing as a monster to be slayed (e.g., p. xii) – but I’ve been looking for a good summary of the Marxist, critical-theory, anti-testing perspective, and this seems to fit.

While slayers of testing often oversimplify and misconstrue their enemy, I was surprised to see this basic distortion of test design (p. 78, emphasis in original).

At the root of this is the fact that all standardized tests are designed to produce what’s called a “bell curve” – what test makers think of as a “normal distribution” of test scores (and intelligence) across the human population. In a bell curve most students get average test scores (the “norm”), with smaller numbers of students getting lower or higher scores. If you look at this graphically, you would see it as a bell shape, where the students getting average scores make up the majority – or the hump – of the curve (Weber, 2015, 2016). Standardized tests are considered “good” or valid if they produce this kind of bell curve, and the data from all of them, even standard’s based exams [sic], are “scaled” to this shape (Tan & Michel, 2011). Indeed, this issue is the reason I titled this book, Unequal By Design, because at their core – baked into the very assumptions at the heart of their construction – standardized tests are designed to produce inequality.

I think I know what Au is getting at here. Tests designed for norm referencing (e.g., selection, ranking, prediction) are optimized when there is variability in scores – if everyone does well or everyone does poorly on the test, scores are bunched up, and it’s harder to make comparisons. So, technically, norm referencing does benefit from inequality.

But this ignores the simple fact that state accountability testing, which is the main focus of the book, isn’t designed solely for normative comparisons. In fact, the primary use of state testing is comparison to performance standards. Norms can also be applied, but, since they aren’t designed for comparison among test takers, state tests aren’t tied to inequality in results. Au distinguishes between norm and criterion referencing earlier in the book (p. 10) but not here, when it really matters.

Au gives three references here, none of which support the claim that test scores must be bell shaped to be valid. Tan and Michel (2011) is an explainer from ETS that says nothing about transforming to a curve. It’s an overview of scaling and equating, which are used to put scores from different test forms onto a common scale for reporting purposes. The Weber references (2015, 2016) are two blog posts that also don’t prove that scores have to be normally distributed, with variation, to be valid. The posts do show lots of example score distributions that are roughly bell shaped, but this is to demonstrate how performance standards can be moved around to produce different pass rates even though the shapes of score distributions don’t change.

Weber (2015) makes the same mistake that Au did, uncritically referencing Tan and Michel (2011) as evidence that test developers intentionally craft bell curves.

After grading, items are converted from raw scores to scale scores; here’s a neat little policy brief from ETS on how and why that happens. Between the item construction, the item selection, and the scaling, the tests are all but guaranteed to yield bell-shaped distributions.

It’s true that tests designed for norm referencing will gravitate toward content, methods, and procedures that increase variability in scores, because higher variability improves precision in score comparisons. But this doesn’t guarantee a certain shape – uniform and skewed distributions could also work well – and, more importantly, the Tan and Michel reference doesn’t support this point at all.

I assume Au and Weber don’t have any good references here because there aren’t any. State tests aren’t “normalized” as Weber (2016) claims. Rescaling and equating aren’t normalizing. If they produce normal distributions, it’s probably because what state tests are measuring is actually normally distributed. Regardless, the best source of evidence for state testing having inequality “baked into the very assumptions at the heart of their construction” (Au, see above) would be the publicly available technical documentation on how the tests are actually constructed, and the book doesn’t go there.

References

Au, W. (2023). Unequal by design: High-stakes testing and the standardization of inequality. New York, NY: Routledge.

Tan, X., & Michel, R. (2011). Why do standardized testing programs report scaled scores? Why not just report the raw or precent-correct scores? ETS R&D Connections, 16. https://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/RD_Connections16.pdf

Weber, M. (2015, September 25). Common core testing: Who’s the real “liar”? Jersey Jazzman. https://jerseyjazzman.blogspot.com/2015/09/common-core-testing-whos-real-liar.html

Weber, M. (2016, April 27). The PARCC silly season. Jersey Jazzman. https://jerseyjazzman.blogspot.com/2016/04/the-parcc-silly-season.html

Can Educational and Psychological Testing be Equitable?

As you might expect, the answer to this question is, sometimes. Equitable testing depends on what we consider tests, and how we define equity.

In the past few years, we’ve seen a big swell of interest in equity, social justice, and antiracism in educational measurement. Two articles that I reference and share often are Sireci (2020), which encourages us to unstandardize our tests as much as possible (Sireci calls it understandardization) and Randall (2021), which shows how traditional construct development (and thus test development) is too narrow and White-centric to support equitable outcomes. I think the discussion is taking us in the right direction, but we’re also going in circles on some key points, including how educational tests can be equitable or not.

If the measurement literature is a river – not a fantastic analogy, but let’s try it – then ambiguous terms are like eddies, swirling water that defies the current and slows our understanding such that we can end up writing past each other. Equity is arguably the most popular term lately for describing our goals for educational improvement – we see it everywhere, from mission statements to conference themes – yet, it is often left up to interpretation. Articles in a recent special issue of Applied Measurement in Education focusing on equity in assessment (2023, volume 36, issue 3) use the term throughout, but never simply define it. The Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (AERA, APA, NCME, 2014) describes features of testing (e.g., affects, access, treatment of participants) as equitable or inequitable, but again without a clear definition.

Equity just means parity or equality in outcomes across groups. It’s not complicated. Maybe authors take for granted that their readers have this fundamental understanding, or maybe they’re keeping the literature waterways open and a little swirly to promote discussion? Either way, we have a definition. If equity is equality of outcomes across groups, then equitable testing is simply testing that shows equal outcomes, and making tests more equitable means designing them to produce results that don’t differ for groups of test takers.

Side note – the Standards (2014, p. 54) interpret fairness in a way that does not require “equality of testing outcomes for relevant test-taker subgroups.” That’s equity, they just don’t identify it as such.

Extra side note – there’s lots of writing on culturally responsive and sustaining assessment (e.g., Shultz & Englert, 2023). I see this as overlapping with but not the same as equitable testing.

The second term to nail down is testing. Most of us probably think of testing as standardized and large-scale, designed for lots of people. And most of our standardized large-scale tests are used to compare test takers either to one another (e.g., rank ordering when selecting for admission or a scholarship) or to some reference point on our score scale (e.g., performance standards of “meets expectations” or “gets a driver’s license”). Testing also includes smaller-scale and less formal or less standardized measures used in classrooms, clinics, or employment settings.

Putting the terms together, equal outcomes in testing really only make sense for certain kinds of tests. The purpose or intended use determines whether a test can be designed intentionally for equity. Standardized large-scale tests intended to compare results across groups can’t also be designed to reduce differences between groups because the two purposes conflict. Whatever the context, even outside of education and psychology, an instrument can’t indicate and influence results at the same time. However, if we aren’t constrained by comparison, we can design tests however we like, including with content and methods focused on elevating specific groups of test takers.

Proponents of antiracist and socially just educational measurement might argue that testing has traditionally benefitted White/majority groups of test takers – that we’ve only pretended that testing was a fair indicator in the past, when in actuality it was always influencing results. Since both designs or purposes coexisted before, though one of them covertly and perhaps unintentionally, they should also coexist now, especially in situations where comparative testing leads to adverse impact (e.g., as in college admission testing or licensure testing). This kind of argument applies with other restorative policies like affirmative action, but it doesn’t really apply to comparative testing, if only because the purpose of a comparative test might be to evaluate the results of something like affirmative action. Social justice isn’t served by tests that mask social injustice.

Now that I’ve typed this all out – putting on my snorkel and goggles, if you will – I see that the conflict really comes from having equal outcomes as our objective, our main criterion for valid measurement. The measurement water gets turbulent when we consider equity alongside validity. I’ll have to come back to this later.

References

American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, & National Council on Measurement in Education (2014). Standards for educational and psychological testing. Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.

Randall, J. (2021). “Color‐neutral” is not a thing: Redefining construct definition and representation through a justice‐oriented critical antiracist lens. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 40(4), 82-90.

Shultz, P. K., & Englert, K. (2023). The promise of assessments that advance social justice: An indigenous example. Applied Measurement in Education, 36(3), 255-268.

Sireci, S. G. (2020). Standardization and UNDERSTANDardization in educational assessment. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 39(3), 100-105.

What is Educational and Psychological Measurement Like?

Educational and psychological measurement is like lots of things. In introductory textbooks, it’s compared to physical measurement – rulers for measuring length or floor scales for measuring weight. Another popular analogy is shooting at a target. Picture Robin Hood splitting the Sheriff of Nottingham’s arrow, like it’s no big deal, to claim the bullseye – that’s accurate measurement.

Throwing away the thermometer

Sometimes testing, as the embodiment of educational and psychological measurement, is compared to instruments used in medical settings. Here’s a case where the analogy is used in defense of college admission testing (Roorda, 2019).

It’s inappropriate to blame admissions testing for inequities in society. We don’t fire the doctor or throw away the thermometer when an illness has been diagnosed. Test scores as well as high school grades expose issues that need to be fixed.

This analogy is simple and relatable, and mostly OK, but it suggests that tests are as precise as thermometers, that test constructs like math proficiency can be observed and quantified via test questions as well as body temperature via controlled chemical changes. They can’t. Testing is less reliable, and in some cases it may be closer to mercury rising in astrology than in a vacuum tube. I say we throw away the thermometer analogy, or at least put an asterisk on it.

Blood oximeters

Sticking with medical testing, educational and psychological tests are like blood oximeters, instruments used to measure oxygen saturation in the blood. Oxygen saturation is an indicator of respiratory health, like math achievement is an indicator of college readiness. Neither is a perfect measure of the target construct, but they’re both useful.

Oximeters come in a variety of shapes and sizes, employing different technologies that vary in cost and complexity, much like standardized tests. And, as with standardized tests, reliability and accuracy depend on the instrument. The simplest instrument – called the pulse ox – was widely used during the coronavirus pandemic, even though it is known to produce biased results for people of color (Moran-Thomas, 2020; Sjoding et al., 2020), and this was despite the availability of less biased but more complicated alternatives (Moran-Thomas, 2021).

The traditional, ultra-standardized, multiple-choice test is a lot like the pulse ox, developed – for convenience and efficiency – based on a majority group of test takers without fully considering the unique needs of underserved and minoritized students. Our research and industry standards have improved over time, especially since the 1990s, and this has led to less biased tests with comparable predictive validity across groups. So, the pulse ox might be an outdated comparison. But we still prefer simpler testing methods over more expensive and contextualized ones, and we’re still considering what it means to test with equity in mind.

Just do it

Let’s move from tests themselves to the testing industry, which gets us into testing policy.

Koljatic et al. (2021) compare the testing industry to the sporting apparel industry. Focusing on Nike in the 1990s, they argue that we, like Nike, need to accept more responsibility with respect to the social impacts of our products. I (2021) countered that, unlike the apparel industry, we make products for clients according to their specifications. In that respect, our tests are doing what they’re supposed to do – inform fair comparisons among test takers. Really, what needs to change is education policy on test use. The problem for industry, if we extent Koljatic’s reasoning, is that it isn’t doing enough to influence policy. Simply put, industry would need to say no when clients ask for tests that don’t promote equity.

Saying no wouldn’t solve our problems, absent other policy or tools to fill the void, but I think it’s the only conclusion considering what Koljatic and critics are really asking for. How can we make selection tests less like tests used for selection, and more like tests not used for selection, while still having systems that require selection? By not testing, I guess.

In my 2021 article, I tweaked the Nike analogy a bit.

The company recently released a new shoe that can be put on and taken off hands-free, extending their lineup of more accessible footwear (Newcomb, 2021). This innovation is regarded as a major step forward, so to speak, in inclusive and individualized design (Patrick & Hollenbeck, 2021). However, concerns have been raised about accessibility in terms of high cost and limited availability (Weaver, 2021). We can compare to admission testing in a variety of ways, but this example highlights at the very least the need for a more comprehensive consideration of accessibility.

Admission tests, like other large-scale assessments, have historically been inaccessible to students, by design, until the moment of administration. Integration with K12 assessment systems would provide significantly more access and richer data for admission decisions (e.g., Kurlaender et al., 2020), and testing innovations promise measurement that is more individualized and engaging (The Gordon Commission on the Future of Assessment in Education, 2013). Yet, despite these advances, our products will still be largely inaccessible outside controlled conditions, like inclusively designed shoes that can only be rented or worn on certain occasions and under supervision. Our vision should be to distribute full ownership of the product itself.

More on social responsibility

The idea of social responsibility is intriguing. Can the measurement industry be more involved in promoting positive outcomes? Controversies from two other US industries can shed some light here.

Testing resembles the pharmaceutical industry, where standardized tests are like drugs. In both cases, the product can take years to develop and at great expense. Both target practical issues faced by lots of people – for example, ulcerative colitis or pandemic learning loss. Both are designed in laboratory settings. And the countless – sometimes absurd – side effects make us question whether the potential benefits are worth the costs and risks. Drug makers have been found partly responsible for the opioid epidemic because they misrepresented risk and overpromised on results (Haffajee & Mello, 2020). Critics would say we do the same with testing.

We can also learn about social responsibility, and the lack thereof, from social media companies. It looks like Facebook, now Meta, hid what they knew about the harms of Instagram for young people (Gayle, 2021). TikTok, owned by the company ByteDance, is considered a threat to US national security because of how it collects and manages user data (Treisman, 2022). Obviously, nobody is consuming standardized tests like they do algorithmically curated photo and video content. Few people love standardized tests, whereas everyone loves cats chasing lasers. But Meta and ByteDance, like College Board and Smarter Balanced, are making products that have positive and negative impacts depending on their use. And it’s not out of bounds to expect that companies study the negative impacts, share what they know, and contribute to more positive consequences.

Just like drugs and social media, I don’t think standardized testing is going away. I recommend that the testing industry relinquish some secrecy and security and move toward more transparency and free public access to test content, data, and results (Albano, 2021).

References

Albano, A. D. (2021). Commentary: Social responsibility in college admissions requires a reimagining of standardized testing. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 40, 49-52.

Gayle, D. (2021). Facebook aware of Instagram’s harmful effect on teenage girls, leak reveals. The Guardian. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/sep/14/facebook-aware-instagram-harmful-effect-teenage-girls-leak-reveals.

Haffajee, R. L., & Mello, M. M. (2017). Drug companies’ liability for the opioid epidemic. The New England Journal of Medicine377(24), 2301–2305.

Koljatic, M., Silva, M., & Sireci, S. G. (2021). College admission tests and social responsibility. Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, 40(4), 22-27.

Moran-Thomas, A. (2020). How a popular medical device encodes racial bias. Boston Review. Retrieved from http://bostonreview.net/science-nature-race/amy-moran-thomas-how-popular-medical-device-encodes-racial-bias

Moran-Thomas, A. (2021). Oximeters used to be designed for equity. What happened? Wired. Retrieved from https://www.wired.com/story/pulse-oximeters-equity/.

Randall, J., Slomp, D., Poe, M. & Oliveri, M. E. (2022). Disrupting white supremacy in assessment: Toward a justice-oriented, antiracist validity framework. Educational Assessment, 27(2), 170-178.

Roorda, (2019). Comment on X. Retrieved from https://x.com/MartenRoorda/status/1204465574111105024.

Sjoding, M. W., Dickson, R. P., Iwashyna, T. J., Gay, S. E., & Valley, T. S. (2020). Racial bias in pulse oximetry measurement. New England Journal of Medicine, 383, 2477-2478.

Treisman, R. (2022). The FBI alleges TikTok poses national security concerns. NPR. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/2022/11/17/1137155540/fbi-tiktok-national-security-concerns-china.

Article on Intersectional DIF in Applied Measurement in Education

Brian French, Thao Thu Vo, and I recently (February, 2024) published an open-access paper in Applied Measurement in Education on Traditional vs Intersectional DIF Analysis: Considerations and a Comparison Using State Testing Data.

https://doi.org/10.1080/08957347.2024.2311935

The paper extends research by Russell and colleagues (e.g., 2021) on intersectional differential item functioning (DIF).

Here’s our abstract.

Recent research has demonstrated an intersectional approach to the study of differential item functioning (DIF). This approach expands DIF to account for the interactions between what have traditionally been treated as separate grouping variables. In this paper, we compare traditional and intersectional DIF analyses using data from a state testing program (nearly 20,000 students in grade 11, math, science, English language arts). We extend previous research on intersectional DIF by employing field test data (embedded within operational forms) and by comparing methods that were adjusted for an increase in Type I error (Mantel-Haenszel and logistic regression). Intersectional analysis flagged more items for DIF compared with traditional methods, even when controlling for the increased number of statistical tests. We discuss implications for state testing programs and consider how intersectionality can be applied in future DIF research.

We refer to intersectional DIF as DIF with interaction effects, partly to highlight the methodology – which builds on traditional DIF as an analysis of main effects – and to distinguish it as one piece of a larger intersectional perspective on the item response process. We don’t get into the ecology of item responding (Zumbo et al., 2015), but that’s the idea – traditional DIF just scratches the surface.

A few things keep DIF analysis on the surface.

  1. More complex analysis would require larger sample sizes for field/pilot testing. We’d have to plan and budget for it.
  2. Better analysis would also require a theory of test bias that developers may not be in a position to articulate. This brings in the debate on consequential validity evidence – who is responsible for investigating test bias, and how extensive does analysis need to be?
  3. Building on 2, only test developers have ready access to the data needed for DIF analysis. Other researchers and the public, who might have good input, aren’t involved. I touch on this idea in a previous post.

References

Albano, T., French, B. F., & Vo, T. T. (2024). Traditional vs intersectional DIF analysis: Considerations and a comparison using state testing data. Applied Measurement in Education, 37(1), 57-70. https://doi.org/10.1080/08957347.2024.2311935

Russell, M., & Kaplan, L. (2021). An intersectional approach to differential item functioning: Reflecting configurations of inequality. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 26(21), 1-17.

Zumbo, B. D., Liu, Y., Wu, A. D., Shear, B. R., Olvera Astivia, O. L., & Ark, T. K. (2015). A methodology for Zumbo’s third generation DIF analyses and the ecology of item responding. Language Assessment Quarterly, 12(1), 136-151. https://doi.org/10.1080/15434303.2014.972559

Review of Cizek’s Validity Book

I recently reviewed G. J. Cizek’s book Validity – An Integrated Approach to Test Score Meaning and Use (published by Routledge, 2020) for the journal Applied Measurement in Education. Here’s a link to my review.

Here’s an overview, from the first paragraph in the review.

Can measurement inferences be meaningful but not useful? Are we better off evaluating test score interpretations separate from their applications? Does validity theory itself need to be revamped? These are the kinds of big philosophical questions Cizek tackles, though with limited philosophizing, in his book Validity – An Integrated Approach to Test Score Meaning and Use. The premise of the book, that validity does need revamping, won’t come as a surprise to readers familiar with his earlier writing on the topic. The main ideas are the same, as are some of his testing examples and metaphors. However, the book does give Cizek space to elaborate on his comprehensive framework for defensible testing, and the target audience of “rigorous scholars and practitioners… who have no wish to be philosophers of science” may appreciate the book’s focus on pragmatic recommendations over “metaphysical contemplations.”

And here’s my synopsis of the book by chapter.

After an intriguing preface (current validation efforts are described as anemic and lacking in alacrity), the book starts with an introduction to some foundational testing concepts (Chapter 1), and then reviews areas of consensus in validation (e.g., content, response process, convergent evidence; Chapter 2), before highlighting the essential point of disagreement (i.e., how we handle test uses and consequences; Chapter 3). Cizek’s main argument, reiterated throughout the book, is that considerations around score inference should nearly always be detached from considerations around test use, and that combining the two (common in the US since the 1990s) has been counterproductive. He presents a framework that separates a) validation of the intended meaning of scores via the usual sources of evidence, minus uses and consequences (Chapter 4), from b) justifying the intended uses of scores, following theory and methods from program evaluation (Chapter 5). The book ends with recommendations for determining how much evidence is enough for successful validation and justification (Chapter 6), and, finally, a summary with comments on future directions (Chapter 7).

Throughout the book, Cizek critiques the writings of Messick, a distinguished validity theorist, and he acknowledges in the book’s preface that doing so felt like tugging on Superman’s cape. I’m not sure where that puts me, someone who has only ever written about validity as it relates to other issues like item bias. I guess I’m either spitting into the wind or pulling the mask off the Old Lone Ranger.

Though I agree with Cizek on some key issues – including that validity theory is becoming impractically complex – my review of the book ended up being mostly critical. Maybe half of my 1800 or so words went to summarizing two limitations that I see in the book. First, it oversimplifies and sometimes misrepresents the alternative and more mainstream perspective that uses and consequences should be part of validity. Quotations and summaries of the opposing views could have been much tighter (I highlight a few in my review). Second, the book leaves us wanting more on the question of how to integrate information – if we evaluate testing in two stages, based on meaning in scores and justification of uses, how do we combine results to determine if a test is defensible? The two stages are discussed separately, but the crucial integration step isn’t clearly explained or demonstrated.

I do like how the book lays out program evaluation as a framework for evaluating (some would say validating) uses and consequences. Again, it’s unclear how we integrate conclusions from this step with our other validation efforts in establishing score meaning. But program evaluation is a nice fit to the general problem of justifying test use. It offers us established procedures and best practices for study design, data collection, and analyzing and interpreting results.

I also appreciate that Cizek is questioning the ever creeping scope of validity. Uses and consequences can be relevant to validation, and shouldn’t be ignored, but they can also be so complex and open-ended as to make validation unmanageable. Social responsibility and social justice – which have received a lot of attention in the measurement literature in the past three years and so aren’t addressed in their latest form in the book – are a pertinent example. To what extent should antiracism be a component of test design? To what extent should adverse impact in test results invalidate testing? And who’s to say? I still have some reading to do (Applied Measurement in Education has a new special issue on social justice topics), but it seems like proponents would now argue, in the most extreme case, that any group difference justifies pausing or reconsidering testing. Proposals like this need more study and discussion (similar to what we had on social responsibility in admission testing) before they’re applied generally or added to our professional standards.

Calculating Implicit Association Test Scores

I wrote a couple years ago about the limitations of implicit association tests (IAT) for measuring racial bias. Their reliability (test-retest) and validity (correlations with measures of overt bias) are surprisingly low, considering the popularity of the tests.

At the time, I couldn’t find an explanation of how IAT scores are calculated (I didn’t look very hard). Here are a few references.

Some of the original scoring methods come from Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) and updated methods are given in Greenwald, Nosek, and Banjo (2003). All of the methods are based on response latencies measured in milliseconds. Rohner and Thoss (2019) summarize how the methods work and demonstrate with R code.

References

Greenwald, A., McGhee, D., & Schwartz, J. (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1464-1480.

Greenwald, A., Nosek, B., & Banaji, M. (2003). Understanding and using the Implicit Association Test: An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 197-216.

Röhner, J. & Thoss, P. J. (2019) A tutorial on how to compute traditional IAT effects with R. The Quantitative Methods for Psychology, 15(2), 134-147. https://doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.15.2.p134

Differential Item Functioning in the Smarter Balanced Test

In class last fall, we reviewed the Smarter Balanced (SB) technical report for examples of how validity evidence is collected and documented, including through differential item functioning (DIF) analysis.

I teach and research DIF, but I don’t often inspect operational results from a large-scale standardized test. Results for race/ethnicity showed a few unexpected trends. Here’s a link to the DIF section of the 2018/2019 technical report.

https://technicalreports.smarterbalanced.org/2018-19_summative-report/_book/test-fairness.html#differential-item-functioning-dif

The report gives an overview of the Mantel-Haenszel method, and then shows, for ELA/literacy and math, numbers of items from the test bank per grade and demographic variable that fall under each DIF category.

  • The NA category is for items that didn’t have enough valid responses, for a given comparison (eg, female vs male), to estimate DIF. Groups with smaller sample sizes had more items with NA.
  • A, B, C are the usual Mantel-Haenszel levels of DIF, where A is negligible, B is moderate, and C is large. Testing programs, including SB, focus on items at level C and mostly leave A and B alone.
  • The +/- indicates the direction of the DIF, where negative is for items that favor the reference group (eg, male) or disadvantage the focal group (eg, female), and positive is for items that do the opposite, favor the focal group or disadvantage the reference group.

The SB report suggests that DIF was conducted at the field test stage, where items weren’t yet operational. But the results tables say “DIF items in the current summative pool,” which makes it sound like they include operational items. I’m not sure how this worked.

ELA

Here’s a bar chart that summarizes level C DIF by grade for ELA in a subset of demographic comparisons. The blueish bars going up are percentages of items with C+ DIF (favoring focal group) and the redish bars going down are for C- (favoring reference). The groups being compared are labeled on the right side.

Smarter Balanced 2018/2019 DIF results, percentages of items with level C DIF for ELA/literacy

I’m using percentages instead of counts of items because the number of items differs by grade (under 1,000 in early grades, over 2,000 in grade 11), and the number of items with data for DIF analysis varies by demographic group (some groups had more NA than others). Counts would be more difficult to compare. These percentages exclude items in the NA category.

For ELA, we tend to see more items favoring female (vs male) and asian (vs white) students. There doesn’t seem to be a trend for black and white students, but there are more items favoring white students when compared with hispanic (almost none). In some groups, we also see a slight increase for later grades, but a decrease at grade 11.

Math

Here’s the same chart but for math items. Note the change in y-axis (now maxing at 4 percent instead of 2 for ELA) to accommodate the increase in DIF favoring asian students (vs white). Other differences from ELA include slightly more items favoring male students (vs female), and more balance in results for black and white students, and hispanic and white students.

DIF in grades 6, 7, and 11 reaches 3 to 4% of items favoring asian students. Converting these back to counts, the total numbers of items with data for DIF analysis are 1,114, 948, and 966 in grades 6, 7, and 11, respectively, and the numbers of C+ DIF favoring asian students are 35, 30, and 38.

Conclusions

These DIF results are surprising, especially for the math test, but I’d want some more information before drawing conclusions.

First, what was the study design supporting the DIF analysis? The technical report doesn’t describe how and when data were collected. Within a given grade and demographic group, do these results accumulate data from different years and different geographic locations? If so, how were forms constructed and administered? Were field test items embedded within the operational adaptive test? And how were results then linked?

Clarifying the study design and scaling would help us understand why so many items had insufficient sample sizes for estimating DIF analysis, and why these item numbers in the NA category differed by grade and demographic group. Field test items are usually randomly assigned to test takers, which would help ensure numbers of respondents are balanced across items.

Finally, the report leaves out some key details on how the Mantel-Haenszel DIF analysis was conducted. We have the main equations, but we don’t have information about what anchor/control variable was used (eg, total score vs scale score), whether item purification was used, and how significance testing factored into determining the DIF categories.